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The doctrine of proper purpose relates to the manner in which 
directors exercise their powers. I ts origins are to be 
found in the fiduciary relationship in which a director 
stands towards his company and the concomitant duty that this 
relationship imports, namely, to use his office and to exer-
cise his powers bona fide in the interests of the company. 
The significance of the doctrine lies in the separation of 
the duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company, 
from the duty to exercise a fiduciary power for the purpose 
for which· it was intended and not for some imp roper motive. 
f According to the doctrine, the acts of directors may be in-
valid if they exercise a fiduciary power for an improper 
motive, despite the fact that they acted on what they bona 
fide believed to be in the interests of the company. 
Inherent in the doctrine is the conflict between the exercise 
by directors of their managerial powers in terms of the 
memorandum and articles of association of the company, and 
the right of the majority of the shareholders to pursue what-
ever policy they choose 11i thin the company's power, together 
with the prohibition which rests on either party to usurp the 
rights of the other. \ 
1~S~t, ~ )\~v!b 
I 
This thesis will address the circumstances leading up to th.e 
establishment of the doctrine, and the attitude of the Courts 
to the doctrine. In this regard there will be an examina-
/ tion of the nature of the office of the director and the 
obligation which rests upon the directors in the discharge of 
~-
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their fiduciary duties; the nature and development of the 
doctrine of proper purpose; 
reached. 
and finally, the conclusions 
/While there may be considerable doubt as 
~: nature of the office of a director is 
to what the precise 
or what the exact 
posit ion is that he occupies in law, and while the term 
director may not admit of comprehensive definition, there is 
~ no doubt that a director stands in a fiduciary relationship 
<w.~ 
~'(JP to his company. As a result he has the duty to act in good 
faith towards his company, to exercise his powers as a 
director for the benefit of the company and to avoid a 
conflict between his own interests and those of the company. 
The basic fiduciary duties which flow from this relationship 
between a director and his company are that he must use his 
office and exercise his powers bona fide in the interests of 
the company and that he must not place himself in a posj_tion 
in which his personal interests conflict, or may possibly 
conflict with his duties to the company. (2) '· 
\ ... 1\t~ \ 
~\p, . ~Cl'<..J 
' '¥\1'\ 'i 
The above is clear, but what is the position where a director 
fails to exercise the power delegated to him for the purposes 
for which they were conferred? Traditionally, PTOper purpose 
has never been a head of directors' duties, and the investi-
gation is directed at whether the formulation of a director's 
duty to exercise his powers for their true purpose has 
acquired a specialised meaning. This obligation upon direc-
tors to exercise their powers for proper purposes is an obli-
gation which is viewed sometimes as a variant of the duty to 
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act bona fide and at other times something distinct there-
/ This gives rise to a question which is cardinal to the sub-
ject under discussion. Accepting that it is a basic duty of 
I a director to act bona fide in -the interests of the company, 
~
f,' ~. 
QQ.i .J\ 1s it open to directors to say (on an objectively sound 
~~~\ t basis) that they genuinely believe that what they are seeking 
to prevent the majority of shareholders from doing will harm 
the company and that, in taking action whereby the majority 
can be outvoted, they properly exercise their fiduciary 
duties and there should be no interference with such action? 
In other words, is it sufficient for the Court to establish 
that subjectively the directors acted bona fide in the 
interests of the company or must the Court go further and 
determine objectively whether the power was exercised for an 
improper motive? 
The answer to this question gave rise to the doctrine known 
as the proper purpose doctrine, when in Hogg v. Cramphorn ( 4 ) 
it was decided that a genuine belief that the directors were 
acting bona fide in the interests of the company, even if 
well founded, is irrelevant, if the power to issue shares, 
which is a fiduciary power, was exercised for an improper 
motive. Such an issue was liable to be set aside. This 
marked a new approach, that is, where bona fides on the part 
of the directors was expressly found, but their purpose was 
nevertheless declared improper and their decision struck down 
(or at least, referred to the general meeting for considera-
ti on) . It would seem that, in the light of the findings of 
bona fides, another meaning is to be given to the term 
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proper purpose, based on the notion that it is possible to 
define in the abstract, independent of any question of 
motive, the ends which a particular power may legitimately be 
used to attain. The propriety of a particular purpose, in 
this sense, is a matter of construction of the memorandum and 
articles, and as such, a question of law. (5) 
The doctrine relates to an act which prima facie falls within 
the powers delegated to the directors but which they have 
abused by exercising it for an improper purpose. More often 
than not, this improper purpose for which an act is exercised 
wi 11 be to feather the directors' own nests or to preserve 
their own control, i.e. for the purposes of self-interest. 
But this is not always the case, and a duty may be exercised 
improperly even where it does not involve the self-interest 
of the directors. ( 6 ) It has been suggested that there is 
an element of ambiguity in 
be seen as meaning 
the term improper purpose. It 
may improper motive and in certain 
instances the expressions improper motive and improper pur-
pose are used interchangeably. For example, the directors' 
motive may be to confer a benefit on themselves, or an out-
sider, or · a certain faction of shareholders, or even to 
injure a particular party or interest (such as 
bidder), without any benefit to the company. 
of situation, the expression improper purpose 
a take-over 
In this type 
is a 
restatement in negative terms of the bona fide test . 
. What must he borne in mind is that cardinal to the doctrine 
is the exercise of managerial powers of the board of direc-
tors, on the one hand, and the exercise of voting powers of 
the members in general meeting, on the other. If according 
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to the articles, the power of management is vested in the 
directors, they and they alone can exercise such powers. 
The contention will be advanced that where directors, in the 
exercise of their managerial powers, act bona fide in the 
interests of .the company, then, whatever may be their motive 
or purpose, their acts cannot be set aside and no liability 
will attach to them. It is not open to the general meeting 
to usurp these powers. Where directors act outside of or 
beyond their powers, such acts are unauthorised and are 
liable to be set aside in terms of the ordinary rules relat-
ing to authorisation. If the shareholders are dissatisfied 
with the manner in which the directors are exercising their 
managerial powers, their remedy is to act in terms of their 
consti.tutional powers in general meeting. Obviously, it is 
not open to the directors to usurp the powers which are ves-
ted by the articles in the general body of shareholders. 
The situation then is one of management control on the part 
of directors, and voting control on the part of the members 
in general meeting. 
three possibilities. 
This, it is submitted, gives rise to 
First, the directors, acting within 
the scope of their managerial powers, conduct themselves bona 
fide in the interests of the company. Second, the direc-
tors, acting within the scope of their managerial powers, 
conduct themselves mala fide and contrary to the interests of 
the company. Third, the directors act beyond their manage-
rial powers and therefore in an unauthorised manner. It 
will be contended that where directors act bona fide in the 
interests of the company and within their managerial powers, 
there is no scope for a further possibility, namely, that 
their acts are invalid because they conduct themselves for an 
improper purpose. In other words, liability only attaches 
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to the directors, and their acts are only invalid, if they 
act beyond their authority or they act mala fide and contrary 
to the interests of the company. 
The most common application of the proper purpose doctrine 
has been to the power vested in directors to issue shares to 
avoid a take-over bid. It is clear that the power to issue 
shares places dir.ectors under fiduciary duties in regard to 
its use. They must act bona fide in the interests of the 
company and not for some "collateral purpose". The question 
that arises is how far can directors use their powers to 
maintain control of the company in friendly hands, i.e. to 
prevent the predator from affecting the take-over by issuing 
shares so that he can never gain the requisite majority. 
The answer to this question has led to a conflict of views. 
One view is that "directors are not entitled to use their 
powers of issuing shares merely for the purpose of maintain-
ing their control or the control of themselves and their 
friends over the affairs of the company, or merely for the 
purpose of defeating the wishes of the existing majority of 
shareholders" . ( 8) This is so, according to authority, even 
where the directors genuinely harbour the belief that what 
they are seeking to do is to prevent the majority of share-
holders from doing harm to the company. ( 9 ) According to 
this view, the issue of the shares is liable to be set aside 
because the power to issue the shares, being a fiduciary 
power, was exercised for an improper motive. The other view 
is that where directors seek, by the issue of new shares, to 
prevent a majority shareholder from exercising control of the 
company, they will not be held to have failed in their fidu-











they believe, on reasonable grounds, to be in the interests 
of the company. ( 10) Accordingly, as it has been held, 
directors in whom are vested the right and duty of deciding 
where the company's interests lie and how they are to be 
served may be concerned with a wide range of practical 
considerations, and their judgment, if exercised in good 
faith and not for irrelevant purposes, is not open to review 
in the Courts. (ll) These opposing views will be analysed 
and discussed. It will be contended that the modern trend 
is to extend the scope of directors' managerial powers even 
' 
to the extent of encroaching upon the powers of members, 
provided that the acts of directors are exercised bona fide 
in the interests of the company. The contention will be 
that if, subjectively, the directors act bona fide, and, 
objectively, their conduct is justifiable, then such acts 
will not be invalid nor will any liability attach to the 
directors thereanent. 
Following on from what has been said above, a question ~hat 
arises is whether the proper purpose doctrine is merely one 
aspect of the basic duty of directors to act bona fide in the 
interests of the company, i.e. merely the counterpart of such 
test in negative terms, or whether it is a completely 
separate head of directors' duties under which the Court 
looks objectively at the purpose of a particular power and 
then determines whether the directors used the power for that 
purpose, irrespective of whether they were acting in good 
faith. 
In Hogg v. Cramphorn (12) it emerged as a completely separate 




v. Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Co. NL (13), however, the 
High Court of Australia rejected the view that any gloss 
should be put on the bona fide test which would have the 
effect, as a matter of law, of "laying down narrow lines 
within which the concept of the company's interests must 
necessarily fall". And in Teck Corporation Ltd. v. Millar 
( 14), Berger J rejected the approach of Hogg v. Cramphorn 
(1 5 ), preferring the view that the directors can be said to 
have abused their powers only where their purpose was not to 
serve the interest of their company. 
In Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum ( 16 ), the Privy 
Counci 1 had an opportunity to review the whole question. 
The argument, on the one hand, was that once bona fides had 
been established on the part of the directors, that is, they 
were not motivated by self-interest, the issue was valid; 
the counter argument was that once it had been established 
that the shares were issued for purposes other than the rais-
ing of capital, invalidity followed. Both these "extreme" 
arguments were rejected. The Privy Council endorsed the 
view, rather, that the proper purposes for which a power is 
conferred are to be determined as a matter of construction 
and laid down a basis a.s to how the articles of a company 
were to be construed. (17) 
More recently, the doctrine has been considered by the 
Australian Courts without manifesting any unanimity of 
It is in the light of the readiness of some Courts to accept 
the doctrine, and the reluctance of other Courts so to do, 
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that the proper purpose doctrine is investigated. 
In the course of the investigation, the contention will be 
advanced that in the modern commercial context the trend is 
to extend the managerial role; to enlarge the scope of the 
managerial function, and to give a liberal interpretation to 
what constitutes matters of management. It will not be 
disputed that the board of directors and the general meeting 
are the primary organs of the company. Nor will it be 
disputed that with the expansion of the directors' powers to 
manage the business of the company, the rights and powers of 
the members are rendered nugatory. It wi 11 be contended 
that in the light of modern conditions and modern managerial 
technique, it is the directors who stand at the hub of the 
company's business wheels; it is they who are best enabled 
to know what the interests of the company are, and how those 
interests are best served. Accordingly, even if the rights 
of individual shareholders are affected, no liability or 
legal sanction should attach to them, provided they act bona 
fide in the interests of the company and do not exceed their 
authority. Thus, according to the contention, there is no 
need or call for a doctrine of proper purpose. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE NATURE OF THE OFFICE OF DIRECTOR AND THE 
DISCHARGE OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
The control of the business of a company is usually the 
responsibility of the board of directors. But what precise~ 
ly is the nature of the office or the legal position occupied 
by a director? 
Directors have been variously described as agents ( 1 ), and as 
trustees ( 2 ). Whilst such descriptions are not entirely 
inapposite ( 3 ), neither term is sufficiently adequate. 
Lord Justice Cairns described the position of a director 
thus: 
-"What is the position of di rectors of a public company? 
They are merely agents of a company. The company itself 
cannot act in its own person, for it has no person: it 
can only act through directors and the case is, as 
regards those directors, merely the ordinary case of 
principal and agent. Wherever any agent is liable those 
directors would be liable: where the liability would 
attach to the principal, and the principal only, the 
liability is the liability of the company." ( 4 ) 
It is also recognised that directors occupy a position akin 
to that of a trustee ( 5). 
constrained to say:-
In this regard, Romer J was 
"It has sometimes been said that directors are trustees. 
If this means no more than that directors in the perfor-
mance of their duties stand in a fiduciary relationship 
to the company the statement is true enough. But if the 
· statement is meant to be an indication by way of analogy 
of what those duties are, it appears to me to be wholly 
misleading." (6) 
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The dual character of directors is, perhaps, best expressed 
by the following words of Lord Selborne: 
"The directors are the mere trustees or agents of the 
company - trustees of the company's money and property -
agents in the transactions which they enter into on 
behalf of the company." (7) 
Despite the fact that the Courts have declined to place 
directors in a single legal niche for definitional purposes, 
they have nevertheless clearly defined the duties owed by the 
directors to their companies ( 8 ). For most purposes it is 
sufficient to say that directors occupy a fiduciary position 
and all the powers entrusted to them are exercisable in this 
fiduciary capacity. The fiduciary relationship imposes upon 
directors duties of loyalty and good faith, which are akin to 
those imposed upon trustees properly so called. This fidu-
ciary relationship furthermore implies that the fiduciary (in 
this case a director) must at all times act honestly, loyally 
and in the best interests of the company. 
Directors stand therefore in a fiduciary relationship to 
their company ( 9 ) similar to that between an agent and his 
principal or a trustee and his beneficiary. This follows 
partly from the fact that directors act as agents of the 
company and partly from the fact that in some ways the posi-
tion of the director resembles that of a trustee. (lO) How-
ever large their shareholding in the company may be, when 
dealing with the company's assets, directors deal with 
· property that does not belong to them. Accordingly, they 
are obliged to act in the company's best interests, not their 
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This fiduciary duty has manifested itself in two fundamental 
duties:-
(a) a director must use his office and exercise his powers 
bona fide in the interests of the company. ( 12} This 
duty of honesty and good faith in the exercise of his 
powers is in fact the primary fiduciary duty of a 
director. The duty imposed upon directors to act bona 
fide in the interests of the company is a subjective 
one, that is, the directors must act "bona fide in what 
they consider - not what the Court may consider - is in 
the interests of the company". ( 13 ) It is left there-
fore to the directors in the exercise of their business 
judgment to decide how the interests of the company may 
best be promoted. The Courts will interfere only if 
they are satisfied on the evidence that the directors 
did not act in the best interests of the company. The 
Courts have made it clear t.hat proof of fraud or dis-
honesty is not a prerequisite to establishing a breach 
of fiduciary duty in this regard. It has repeatedly 
been emphasised that it is quite possible for a direc-
tor to act honestly and without any fraudulent intent 
and for his acts not to be in the best interests of the 
company ( 14 ). 
Daily News Ltd. 
This is well illustrated by Parke v. 
(15 ) which arose out of the sale of the 
ailing News Chronicle and Star. The Cadbury family, 
who controlled the selling company, 
bute the whole of the purchase 
employees who would become redundant. 
wished to distri-
price among the 
At the suit of 
one shareholder they were restrained from doing so. 
To the argument that "the prime duty must be to the 
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shareholders; but boards of directors must take into 
consideration their duties to employees in these days," 
Plowman J said: 
"But no authority to support that proposition as a 
proposition of law was cited to me; I know of 
none, and in my judgment such is not the law". 
(b) a director must not place himself in a position in 
which his personal interests ~onflict, or may possibly 
(·16) conflict with his duties to the company. 
These two general duties essentially form the backdrop 
against which the Courts over the years have chrystallised 
the more specific duties which constitute the modern fidu-
ciary duties (17). It is obviously unnecessary for the 
purposes of this thesis to deal with or even advert to all of 
these duties. The focus will be on one of these specific 
duties, i.e. the duty not to act for an improper purpose. 
It is important at this stage to emphasise that the duty in 
relation to improper purpose is founded in and derives its 
authority from the generally recognised principles of a 
director's fiduciary duties mentioned above. 
There are two specific features of these general fiduciary 
duties which are required to be highlighted at this stage. 
First, whereas the authority of directors to bind the company 
usually depends on their acting collectively as a board (save 
where the authority has been properly delegated or the 
articles provide otherwise), duties of good faith are owed by 
each director individually. This principle ensures that the 
collective wisdom of the board is available to the company on 
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important decisions, and enables discussion to take place 
before a decision is taken (18). Second, the fiduciary 
duties are owed to the company and the company alone~ the 
directors owe no such duties to individual shareholders. (19) 
In Percival v. Wright (20) a person who had approached a 
director and sold him shares in the company, afterwards, upon 
discovering that negotiations were afoot for the purchase by 
an outsider of all the shares in the company at a higher 
price, could not impeach the contract. Although directors' 
duties are owed primarily to, and enforceable by, the company 
and not the individual shareholders, the company is under-
stood thereby to be comprised of the shareholders as a whole 
and not to be the company as an abstract entity distinct from 
its members. Indeed the expression "the company" has been 
held to mean the members as a whole and not some particular 
section or sections of the membership. ( 21 ). 
Arising out of these general duties, the first observation is 
that the directors must act bona fide in what they consider, 
and not what the Courts consider, is in the interests of the 
company. ( 22 ) That is to say, that the Court is concerned 
with the state of mind of the directors, with the propriety 
of the motive on which they acted ( 23 ), and will not usurp 
the function of the directors and consider what is best for 
the company from a business point of view. Directors may 
therefore not exercise their powers or use their posj_tions 
for the purpose of defeating or injuring the interests of the 
·company. ( 24 ) Likewise, directors may not exercise their 
powers for the purpo~e of furthering their own interests ( 25 ) 
or in the interests of persons other than the shareholders. 
(26) 
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In this regard, Gower makes the following points:-
(a) The fact that directors are fiduciaries imposes upon 
them the subjective duty of honesty and good faith. 
In other words, the directors must act bona fide in 
what they believe to be in the best interests of the 
company. 
(27) 
This is tested on common sense principles. 
.(b) Despite the separate .personality of the company it is 
clear that directors, in being obliged to act in the 
interests of the company, are not expected to act on 
the basis of what is for the economic advantage of the 
corporate entity, disregarding the interests of the 
members. (28) On the other hand, however, it is 
manifestly apparent that "the company" does not mean 
the sectional interests of certain of the members but 
can mean the interests of creditors. (2 9 ) 
A director acts in breach of this duty when he causes the 
company to guarantee his personal indebtedness (30); or to 
discount a bill of exchange in favour of the company for his 
private purposes ( 31 ); or for his own purposes to pay some-
body else's debt ( 32); or where he pays a cheque drawn in 
favour of the company into his personal banking account and 
misappropriates the proceeds of the cheque - even if he is 
the sole director and the sole . shareholder of the company 
(33); or where he sabotages the company's contractual oppor-
tunities for his own advantage or canvasses the company's 
employees for a trade rival. (34) Such acts are manifestly 
acts which are not bona fide in the interests of the company 
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and can never constitute an honest exercise by the director 
of his judgment as to what is in the company's interests. 
(35) 
What appears to emerge from the above investigation is that 
the question of proper purpose in the exercise of a power by 
a director is not irrelevant to the question of a breach of 
his fiduciary duties. Normally, such evidence will be 
vitally important to a determination of whether the director 
i;l.Cted bona fide in the interests of the company. The point, 
however, must be emphasised that whilst such evidence can in 
many instances be of assistance, it is not a prerequisite for 
liability. Proof of acting for an improper purpose by it-
self will not necessarily be sufficient to found a breach of 
fiduciary duty. Prior to the decision in Hogg v. Cramphorn 
( 36) (which will feature with some prominence in this disser-
tation), it was accepted by the Courts that where directors 
acted bona fide in the best interests of the company such was 
sufficient to indicate that no breach of a fiduciary duty had 
occurred, despite the fact that a power had been used for a 
purpose other than that for which it had been granted. (37) 
Where, however, powers had been used by directors manifestly 
for purposes other than that for which they were intended, 
and not for the benefit of the company, it has been held that 
such conduct was not bona fide, constituted a breach of a 
fiduciary duty, and gave cause for the Court to intervene 
( 38) • 
The formulation of a director's duty to exercise his powers 
for their true purpose has acquired a specialised meaning as 
a result of judgments dealing with a directorate which has 
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used its power to issue shares to ensure its continued 
control over the company instead of using it for its true 
purpose, namely to acquire additional capital for the company 
or some other legitimate or justifiable purpose. (39) In 
several cases the Court has considered the directors' powers 
to issue shares, and it has been held that "directors are not 
entitled to use their power of issuing shares merely for the 
purpose of maintaining their control or the control of them-
selves and their friends over the affairs of the company, or 
merely for the purpose of defeating the wishes of the exist-
ing majority of shareholders". (40) Such acts have been 
considered by the Courts to be acts which are not bona fide 
in the interests of the company. (41) In Hogg v. Cramphorn 
Buckley J., in holding that the directors had acted for an 
improper purpose, made it clear that the requirement to act. 
for a proper purpose was distinct from the requirement that 
directors act bona fide. (42) 
Cilliers & Benade ( 43 ), citing Hogg v. Cramphorn ( 44 ) ·and 
Sammel v. President G.M. Co. Ltd. ( 45 ) state as follows:-
"This limitation is also relevant when the directorate 
exercises its powers to foi 1 a take-over bid for the 
shares of members. The directors act in breach of their 
fiduciary duties if they exercise their powers in such a 
way that they can outvote the majority, whether that 
majority lies with a take-over bidder or not, merely 
because of their belief that the party staging the take-
over will not serve the interests of the company in the 
way they would like to see it being done." 
The directors must therefore use their powers for their true 
pur~ose and not, for. instance, for frustrating the wishes of 
the majority. Thus, according to the doctrine, they will 
- 20 -
not be allowed to use their powers to allot shares with the 
object of defeating the pre-existing majority. ( 46) 
/ 
( 1) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
DOCTRINE OF PROPER PURPOSE 
.A director stands in a fiduciary relationship to his company 
with the result that he has the duty to act in good faith 
towards his company, to exercise his powers as a director for 
the benefit of the company and to avoid a conflict between 
his own interests and those of the company ( 1 ). The fidu-
ciary duties of loyalty and good faith are not much different 
from those of anyone else standing in a fiduciary relation-
ship to another (like an agent to his principal or a trustee 
to his beneficiary) although certain characteristic rules 
developed in relation to company law ( 2 ). In view of the 
indefinable multiplicity of duties imposed on a director by 
virtue of his fiduciary position, only the general principles 
relating to certain of those duties will be dealt with. 
Firstly, he must avoid conflict of interests, which implies 
that a director may obtain no other advantage from his office 
than that to which he is entitled by way of directors' 
remuneration and that as a rule he may only contract with his 
company with the approval of a general meeting. Secondly, 
he must not make use for personal gain of information which 
he has acquired in his capacity as director. Thirdly, he 
must maintain and exercise an unfettered discretion. This 
in turn implies that he must consider the affairs of the 
company in an object.i ve manner. Fourthly, he must exercise 
his powers for the purpose for which they were conferred ( 3 ). 
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The basis on which a director is held liable by his company 
for a breach of his fiduciary duty is the general principle 
that a person standing in a fiduciary relationship to another 
commits a breach of trust if he acts for his own benefit or 
to the prejudice of that other 
shares by which th~ voting 
(4). Where directors issue 
in general meeting would be 
manipulated in their own interests, they act to benefit them-
selves and in the result, in breach of their fiduciary duties 
( 5) • 
DECISIONS BEFORE HOGG V. CRAMPHORN: 
In Punt v. Symons & Co. Ltd. ( 6 ), in order to determine 
whether the directors had acted in breach of their fiduciary 
duties, the determining factor was thei:c bona fides in rela-
tion to the interest of the Company. In terms of the 
company's articles the governing director was given the power 
to appoint and remove directors. On his death the same 
power was exercisable by his executors. Friction arose 
between his executors and the two directors of the company. 
Of the company's 11000 shares the executors controlled 6300 
and the two directors, between them, 3073. The company's 
articles provided that every question submitted to a general 
meeting should in the first instance be decided by a show of 
hands, and that a. poLl could only be demanded by at least 
five members. The directors issued eleven shares to five 
new shareholders an4. called an extraordinary general meeting 
for the purpose of passing a special resolution to rescind 
the articles conferring upon the executors the power to 
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appoint and remove the directors. At this meeting the 
special resolution was duly passed by virtue of the new 
shareholders, nine voting for the resolution and three 
against it, the executors being in the minority. 
Byrne· J held that the issue of the shares to the five new 
shareholders was a breach of the directors' fiduciary 
duties. He said: 
" •.• I am quite clear that these shares were not issued 
bona fide for the general advantage of the company, but 
that. they were issued for the immediate object of 
controlling the holders of the greater number of shares 
in the company, and of obtaining the necessary statutory 
majority for passing a special resolution • • . A power 
of the kind exercised by the directors in this case, is 
one which must be exercised for the benefit of the 
company: primarily it is given them for the purpose of 
enabling them to raise capital when required for the 
purpose of the company." ( 7 ) 
It was decided that where shares were issued, in order to 
obtain sufficient votes to procure an amendment to the 
. articles, which would have deprived certain shareholders of 
the right to appoint and remove directors, such was an abuse 
of power by the directors. The basis of the decision was 
that such conduct was not bona fide for the general interest 
of the company, i.e. a breach of the basic fiduciary duty. 
Similarly, in Piercy v. s. Mills & Co. Ltd. ( 8 ), the deter-
mining factor was the bona fides of the directors in relation 
to the interests of the company. Here, the directors sought 
to override the wishes of the holders of the majority of the 
shares of the compar1y for the time being, by the issue of 
fresh shares issued solely for that purpose. The question 
with which Petersen J had to deal, was whether the directors 
- 26 -
were justified in acting as they did, or whether their con-
duct was a "breach of the fiduciary powers which they 
possessed under the articles". (9) 
The learned Judge referred to Punt v. Symons & Co. Ltd. (10) 
and to the case which had featured prominently therein, name-
ly, Fraser v. Whalley (11) and came to the conclusion that: 
" The Plaintiff and his friends held the majority of 
shares of the company, and they were entitled, so long as 
that majority remained, to have their views prevail in 
accordance with the regulations of the company: and it 
was not, in my opinion, open to the directors, for the 
purpose of converting minority into a majority, and sole-
ly for the purpose of defeating the wishes of the exist-
ing majority, to issue the shares which are in dispute in 
the present action .•. the issue of the shares in ques-
tion was a breach on the part of the directors of 
their fiduciary powers." ( 12) 
It was thus an abuse of power for directors to make an issue 
of shares to themselves in order to retain voting control at 
general meetings, and not in order to raise additional 
capital for the company. His Lordship's reference with 
approval to certain aspects of the findings in Punt v. Symons 
& Co. Ltd. ( 1 3) makes it clear that the decision in this case 
too was based on a breach of the basic fiduciary duty, name-
ly, that the shares had not been issued bona fide for the 
general advantage of the company. (14) 
Thus for directors to abuse t~eir· powers or to use those 
powers for the improper purpose of feathering their own nests 
or preserving their own control of the company, such wi 11 
constitute a breach of the duty to act honestly for the bene-
fit of the company as a whole (15). Against such a doctrine 
there can be no complaint as it is in keeping with the 
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fiduciary role played by directors, and the fiduciary duties 
imposed upon them. In terms of the doctrine, if a Plaintiff 
can establish dishonesty or disloyalty or a breach of trust 
on the part of a director in the exercise of his duties, he 
will establish liability on the part of the director. Con-
versely, if the director can prove honesty, loyalty and bona 
fides, a claim against him will fail, even if the purpose for 
which he had exercised his powers was improper. 
While not a part of the body of case law, i.t is convenient 
and instructive at this point to consider what has been 
referred to as "one of the most informative rulings on the 
invalidity of the exercise of directors' powers when used for 
improper purposes", (16 ) namely, that contained in the report 
of Mr. E. Milner Holland, Q.C. who acted as an inspector to 
investigate the affairs of Savoy Hotel Ltd. ( 1 7 ). The 
directors of Savoy Hotel Ltd. knew that certain persons were 
seeking to acquire sufficient shares in the company to give 
them control of it so that they may compel the board to con-
vert a hotel owned by one of Savoy's subsidiaries into 
off ices. The conversion would undoubtedly have yielded a 
greater profit to Savoy's subsidiary, and therefore to Savoy, 
than the continued use of the premises as a hotel. Savoy's 
directors, however, considered that the retention of the 
hotel was in the best interests of the company, and they 
devised a scheme by which it was made impossible for the con-
trolling shareholders ,of Savoy to carry out the conversion. 
· A new company was formed with a share capital consisting of 
£640,000 in preference shares and £10,000 in ordinary shares 
which carried most of the voting rights in general meeting. 
Savoy's subsidiary sold the hotel to this new company in 
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exchange for preference shares, and the ordinary shares were 
~~ 
subscribed for in cash by th~ trustees of a benevolent fund 
'-._ . I 
for Savoy's employees. Savoy's directors knew that the 
trustees could be relied on to fall in with their wishes in 
exercising the majority voting rights conferred by the 
ordinary shares. The new company then leased the hotel back 
to Savoy's subsidiary, but subject to a covenant that it 
should be used only as a hotel. · It thus became impossible 
for a controlling shareholder of Savoy to compel its direc-
tors to convert the hotel into offices, · even if an entirely 
new board were installed in office. 
Mr. Milner Holland observed that the transaction was not 
carried out for the personal benefit of Savoy's directors, or 
to perpetuate them in office. 
the transaction he said:-
After stating the effect of 
11 but by no action on their part could the stock-
holders [of Savoy] ever thereafter alter the decision of 
their present Board as to the present or future use of 
the property of the company. The exercise of the direc-
tors' powers was ·therefore used ih order to render 
irrevocable for all time the policy view of the present 
board. In my opinion, such a use of directors' powers 
is in principle not distinguishable from an issue of 
shares to affect voting power, and, however proper the 
motive behind it, it is not a purpose for which those 
powers were conferred on the board. Powers conferred by 
the shareholders on directors for the purpose of managing 
the business of the company cannot be used for the pur-
pose of depriving those shareholders of such control as 
under the regulations of the company they may have over 
the company's assets. 11 ( 18) 
This ruling is generally regarded as the forerunner to the 
proper purpose doctrine. It was made prior to the decision 
in Hogg v. Cramphor~ (19 ) and is clearly indicative that the 
powers given to shareholders by the articles, limited as they 
often are, cannot be taken away indirectly by the misuse of 
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the board's managerial powers. Furthermore, the criterion 
for testing the propriety of directors' acts, namely, whether 
they are for the benefit of the company, does not depend on 
the directors' own views of what will be best for it, but on 
whether those acts are designed to achieve the objects which 
the shareholders constitutionally decide the · company shall 
pursue. (20) 
HOGG v. CRAMPHORN: 
Hogg v. Cramphorn ( 21 ) is a milestone in the development of 
the proper purpose doctrine. In order to defeat a take-over 
bid, the directors devised a scheme to increase the potential 
voting power in their favour by issuing shares to a specially 
created trust, which was to have loaded votes, and where the 
shares were paid for by a loan from what in fact were company 
funds. It was common cause that the purpose of the scheme 
was to foil the bid to take over the company. The scheme 
was, however, put into operation because the directors 
believed that the bidder "had no experience of the particular 
kind of business carried on by the company"; that "there 
would be a change in the nature of the company's trading"; 
and that "the offer would unsettle the company's staff". 
The court held that:-
" the directors were not actuated by any unworthy 
motives of personal advantage, but acted as they did in 
an honest belief that they were doing what was for the 
good of the company ... I am sure that Col. Cramphorn and 
also probably his fellow directors firmly believed that 
to keep the management of the company's affairs in the 
hands of the existing board would be more advantageous to 
the shareholders, the company's staff and its customers 
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than if it were committed to a board selected by ( the 
bidder)." (23) 
The Court accordingly accepted that "the board acted in good 
faith and that they believed that the establishment of a 
trust would benefit the company and that avoidance of the 
acquisition of control by (the bidder) would also benefit the 
company" ( 24 ). Nonetheless, the Court went on to add:-
"I must still remember that an essential element of the 
scheme, and indeed its primary purpose, was to ensure 
control of the company by the directors and those whom 
they could confidently regard as their supporters. Was 
such a manipulation of the voting position a legitimate 
act on the part of the directors?" (25) 
The Court accordingly came to the conclusion that it was not 
"open to the directors ••• to say 'We genuinely believe that 
what we seek to prevent the majority from doing will harm the 
company and, therefore our act in arming ourselves or our 
party with sufficient shares to outvote the majority is a 
conscientious exercise of our powers under the articles, 
which should not be interfered with' . 
if well-founded, would be irrelevant 
the shares was a fiduciary power and if 
Such a belief, even 
The power to issue 
it was exercised 
for an improper motive, the issue of these shares is lial)le 
to be set aside." (26) Thus, notwithstanding that directors 
act honestly in what · they believe to be the benefit of the 
company, they may nevertheless be liable if they exercise 
their powers for a purpose different from that for which the 
powers were conferred on them. (27) 
The decision in Hogg v. Cramphorn, however, seems to mark a 
point of departure from the accepted doctrine, and gives rise 
to the possibility of the establishment of a different 
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doctrine of proper purpose, and a new basis for liability on 
the part of directors. The conduct of the directors 
involved a frustration of the powers of the members in 
general meeting, but the Court found that they bona fide 
considered their conduct to be in the interests of the 
company ( 28). Nonetheless, the Court held that the direc-
tors had acted in breach of their fiduciary duties (29). It 
follows, in the light of this decision, that liability can 
attach to directors irrespective of clear proof of bona fides 
on the part of directors in respect of their conduct (30). 
On an analysis of the decision of Buckley J in Hogg v. 
Cramphorn ( 31 ), the essential characteristic of the new 
doctrine is a separation of the duty to act bona fide in the 
interests of the company, from the duty to exercise a fidu-
ciary power for the purpose for which it was intended and not 
for some improper motive. On the one hand, Buckley J held 
"that the directors had not been actuated by any unworthy 
motives of personal advantage, but acted as they did in an 
honest belief that what they were doing was for the good of 
the company" (32 ); and on the other hand, ,"that an essential 
element of the scheme and indeed its primary purpose, was to 
ensure control of the company by the directors and those whom 
they could confidently regard as their supporters (33) ••• it 
was exercised for an improper motive ••• 11 ( 34) • 
The decision in Hogg v. Cramphorn ( 35 ) has attracted con-
siderable academic interest and comment. In order to deter-
mine the nature of the doctrine, the viewpoints of certain of 
the writers on the subject will be considered. 
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Beuthin assesses the gravamen of Buckley J's finding thus: 
"Although Buckley J did not expressly say so, his deci-
sion seems to involve a rejection of the idea that the 
1 purpose I for which powers are conferred upon directors 
is inextricably linked with their duties of good faith". 
(36) 
J.R. Birds, in summing up the proper purpose doctrine, as it 
arose out of the judgment in Hogg v. Cramphorn, suggests that 
it is not "merely one aspect of the basic duty of directors 
to act bona fide in the interests of the company". Rather, 
.it is "a completely separate head of directors I duties under 
which the Court looks objectively at the purpose of a parti-
cular power and then determines whether the evidence of the 
directors used the power for that purpose, irrespective of 
whether they were acting in good faith''. (37) 
Gower, in analysing the doctrine, similarly draws a distinc-
tion between what may be described as a bona fide related 
purpose, such as directors feathering their own nest or 
preserving their own control of the Company and thereby 
attracting liability, and a non-bona fide related purpose, 
such as where directors have acted honestly in what they 
believe to be to the benefit of the company, but nevertheless 
are still held liable for exercising their power for an 
improper purpose:-
"If directors exercise their powers for purposes other 
than those for which they were conferred, it may be said 
that they had exceeded their authority and are liable 
accordingly. But it probably makes for clarity to dis-
tinguish between an act ultra vires the directors because 
they have usurped a power which they never had, and an 
act which prirna·facie is ~ithin the powers delegated to 
them but thich they have abused by exercising it for an 
improper purpose. The former hardly seems to be a 
breach of the fiduciary duty of good faith: the latter 
- 33 -
is. Often the improper purpose will be to feather the 
directors' own nests or to preserve their own control, in 
which event it will be a breach of the duty, already con-
sidered, to act honestly for the benefit of the company 
as a whole. But it is clear that notwithstanding that 
directors have acted honestly in what they believe to be 
the benefit of the company they may nevertheless be 
liable if they have exercised their powers for a purpose 
different from that for which the powers were conferred 
upon them." ( 38) 
Gore-Brown refers to the various powers to which the doctrine 
has been held applicable and comes to the following general 
conclusion. 
"But the principle (the doctrine of proper purpose) is 
without doubt one of general application, to be invoked 
in relation to any power whose purpose can clearly be 
discerned from the articles. It is submitted that .•• 
the consequences of infringement of the principle are the 
same as apply in relation to the principle of bona fides 
II ( 39) ... 
Obviously, the judgment of Buckley J in ?ogg v. Cramp horn 
(40 ) has given rise to considerable judicial reaction. 
Before this case law is discussed, certain observations are 
made as to the nature of the newly-emerged doctrine. First-
ly, it is manifestly clear that'a doctrine of proper purpose 
has always existed as an essential aspect of the exercise by 
directors of their fiduciary duties. This doctrine, how-
ever, was integrally bound up with the requirement that 
directors act bona fide in the interests of the company. 
Where they acted out of self-interest, such would constitute 
a breach of the duty to act honestly for the benefit of the 
company as a whole. In other words, the impropriety of the 
director's acts, and the attendant liability, was determined 
by an application of the "bona fide in the interests of the 
company" test, and no other. L.S. Sealy suggests that there 
is an element of ambiguity in the term "improper· purpose" (or 
"collateral purpose"). He goes on to say that: 
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"It may be seen as meaning improper motive; and in some 
cases cited the expressions 'improper motive' and 'im-
proper purpose' are used interchangeably. For example, 
the directors' motive. may be to confer a benefit on them-
selves, or an outsider, or a certain faction of share-
holders, or even to injure a particular party or interest 
(such as a take-over bidder) without any benefit to the 
company. In this type of situation, the expression 
'improper purpose' is simply a restatement in negative 
terms of the 'bona fide' test." (41) 
Secondly, and largely arising out of the Hogg v. Cramphorn 
case circumstances could present themselves where 
directors do not act for any purposes of self-interest, and 
act honestly in what they believe to be the benefit of the 
company, and yet be liable if they have exercised their 
powers for a purpose different. from that for which the. powers 
were conferred upon them. This is the new doctrine of 
proper purpose, the essential elements of which seem to be: 
arising out of the duty upon directors to act bona fide in 
the interests of the company, a determination must be made as 
to whether they did act bona fide in the interests of the 
company or not • If they did not so act, then they are in 
breach of their fiduciary duties and this completes the 
investigation (43). If bona fides on the part of the direc-
tors ha·s been established, the investigation then turns on 
,.I 
whether the directors have acted for a proper purpose or 
not. This obviously necessitates a determination of what 
the purpose of their action was. If, in the exercise of 
their powers, they acted for a purpose other than that for 
which such powers are construed as having been conferred, 
such will be indicative of the powers being exercised for an 
improper purpose, and· could give rise to liability on the 
part of the directors, despite the presence of bona fides. 
Sealy sums up this "new approach", i.e. where bona fides on 
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the part of directors was expressly found, or conceded, but 
their "purpose" was nevertheless declared "improper" and 
their decision struck down, as follows:-
"Commentators have sought, in the light of the finding of 
bona fides, to give another meaning to the term 'improper 
purpose', based on the notion that it is possible to 
define in the abstract, independently of any question of 
motive, the ends which a particular power may 
legitimately be used to attain." (44) 
This new doctrine manifestly gives rise to a new basis of 
liability, i.e. even if the director satisfies the Court that 
he acted bona fide in the interests of the company, he can 
still be liable. This gives rise to numerous questions: 
does such a doctrine exist? Is there support for such a 
doctrine? It is proposed to investigate and scrutinize the 
averments in support of the doctrine, and to test the doc-
trine in the light of judicial decisions subsequent to that 
in Hogg v. Cramphorn (45). 
The case law following upon the decision in Hogg v. Cramphorn 
(46) is now considered. 
DECISIONS AFTER HOGG v. CRAMPHORN: 
In Harlowe's Nominees (Pty) Ltd. v. Woodside (Lake's 
Entrance) Oil Co. ( 47 ), the company which was engaged in oil 
and gas exploration allotted 9 million 50 cent shares, paid 
up to 10 cents each, but at a premium of 20 cents to a large 
oil company with ample resources, subject to a detailed 
agreement with the allottee company. It was alleged by an 
existing shareholder, with an interest in between 10,3% and 
1 7, 3% of the issued capital, that the company had at the time 
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no immediate need of additional share capital and that the 
directors, to the knowledge of the allottee company, had 
caused the shares to be allotted for the purpose of prevent-
ing the plaintiff shareholder from obtaining the voting power 
it expected to obtain by buying the shares on the open market 
and of safeguarding their positions as directors of the 
company and that thereby the allotment and issue of the 
shares was not made bona fide and in the interests of the 
company as a whole. 
In the Court of first instance, the trial judge expressed the 
view that, on the evidence, the purpose of the allotment and 
issue of the shares was not to defeat the plaintiff's attempt 
to obtain control or preserve the directors' positions on the 
board of the company, but was to ensure the financial stabi-
l i ty of the company. On this ground the action was dis-
missed. The matter went to the higher Court who affirmed 
the decision of the trial judge. 
stated by the Court of Appeal that: 
Significantly, it was 
" there may be occasions when the directors may fairly 
and properly issue shares for other reasons (i.e. other 
than to raise capital), so long as these reasons relate 
to a purpose benefiting the company as a whole, as dis-
tinguished from a purpose, for example, of maintaining 
control of the company in the hands of the directors 
but the ultimate question must always be whether in truth 
the issue was made honestly in the interests of the 
company ..• " ( 48) 
It is respectfully submitted that the effective decision of 
the Appeal Court is two-fold: firstly, the ultimate test is 
whether the issue was made honestly in the interests of the 
company; and secondly, provided that the actual purpose of 
the directors in making the issue is to advance the economic 
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interests of the company, then no fiduciary duty is breached. 
The decision seems to be in conflict with that pronounced in 
Hogg v. Cramphorn (49). At the least, there appears to be a 
reluctance to follow a doctrine of proper purpose, and rather 
to remain committed to the basic duty of acting bona fide in 
the interests of the company. 
The Canadian case of Teck Corporation Ltd. v. Millar (50) is 
now considered. Teck Corporation which held a majority 
shareholding in Afton Mines Ltd., indicated an intention to 
replace the board of Afton with its own nominees with the 
view to causing Afton to enter into an agreement with itself 
(Teck) for the exploration by Teck of mineral rights owned by 
Afton. Before this could be done, and in order to prevent 
it, the directors of Afton concluded an exploration agreement 
with another company. One of the provisions of the agree-
ment, according to common practice in this type of agreement 
in Canada, provided for the issue to the other company of a 
large number of shares in Afton, thus displacing Teck's majo-
rity. In an action brought by Teck against Afton, Teck 
acknowledged that Afton's directors had not acted purely out 
of self-interest and that they may well have considered it to 
be in the best interest of Afton to defeat Teck's majority. 
Nonetheless, on the strength of the decision in Hogg v. 
Cramphorn ( 51 ), it was argued that Afton's directors had 
violated their fiduciary duties. 
Berger J declined to ·follow Hogg v. Cramphorn ( 52 ) and relied 
upon the "basic unchallenged principle of equity", namely 
that "they (the directors) must exercise their discretion 
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bona fide in what they consider not what a Court may 
consider - to be in the interests of the company, and not for 
any collateral purpose." ( 53) Effectively this decision of 
Berger J was two-fold. Fir st ly it declined to follow the 
decision in Hogg v. Cramphorn (54). The learned Judge 
opined as follows:-
"I think that directors are entitled to consider the 
reputation, experience and policies of anyone seeking to 
take over the company. If they decide, on reasonable 
grounds, a take-over will cause substantial damage to the 
company's interests, they are entitled to use their 
powers to protect the company." (55) 
Secondly, it took the view that the only "improper purpose" 
was a purpose not designed to serve the best interests of the 
company. ( 56 ) 
On analysis, the conclusion cannot be escaped that in the 
view of Berger J, the proper purposes doctrine is not a 
separate rule of equity but merely an aspect of the broader 
principle that the directors must act bona fide in the 
interests of the company. The learned Judge said: 
"I think that the Courts should apply the general rule in 
this way: The directors must act in good faith. Then 
there must be reasonable grounds for their belief. If 
they say that they believe there will be substantial 
damage to the company's interests, then there must be 
reasonable grounds for that belief. If there are not, 
that will justify a finding that the directors were 
actuated by an improper purpose." ( 5 7) 
It is submitted that in the judgment there is manifested a 
reluctance to impose upon a director any duty other than to 
act bona fide in the· interests of the company. 
Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum (58) also involved 
\ : 
an 1 • 
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issue of shares. Ampol, together with a related company 
controlled approximately 55% of the issued shares in a 
company known as R.W. Millar (Holdings) Ltd. Ampol submit--
ted a bid to Miller for the remaining shares but this was 
rejected as too low by the board of directors. A rival 
take-over bid was made by Howard Smith Ltd. at a slightly 
higher price which the majority of the directors favoured. 
Thereupon, Ampol joined forces with another substantial 
shareholder and announced an intention to reject' the Howard 
Smith of fer. Meanwhile Millers needed capital which it was 
in the process of raising by means of loan capital. To 
overcome Ampol 's opposition, the board of Millers allotted 
unissued shares to Howard Smith which had the effect of 
providing the needed capital but at the same time diluted the 
holdings of Ampol and placed them in a minority position. 
In the result the Howard Smith bid proved possible by the 
vote of all the shareholders other than Ampol. Ampol 
sought, successfully, to invalidate the allotment. 
At the trial in the Equity Division of the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales, the Chief Judge in Equity, Street J, found, 
firstly, that the allotment had not been made by the direc-
tors of Millers for any reason of self interest. Secondly, 
it was held that the primary purpose of the allotment was not 
to satisfy any need for capital but to destroy the majority 
holding of Ampol, thus opening the way to the success of the 
Howard Smith offer. On the basis of these findings the 
learned Judge ordered that the issue of shares be set aside. 
The Privy Council upheld this decision. One argument 
advanced was that, fpr validity, what was required was bona 
fide exercise of the power in the interests of the company 
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and that once it is found that the directors were not motiva-
ted by self interest, i.e. by a desire to retain their 
control of the company or their positions on the board, the 
matter was concluded in their favour and that the Court would 
not enquire into the validity of their reasons for making the 
·issue. In other words, the invalidity of an issue of shares 
was directly related to directors having acted through self 
interest. The argument advanced on the other side was that 
the purpose for which the power was conferred was to enable 
capital to be raised for the company, and that once it was 
found that the issue was not made for that purpose, invalidi-
. ty follows. ( 59 ) The Court regarded these opposing stand-
points as "the extreme positions" and opined that neither 
could be maintained. (60) It held that although the majori-
ty of cases in which an issue of shares bad been challenged 
were cases in which the self interest of directors was the 
vitiating element, it did not follow that the absence of any 
element of self interest was ~nough to make the issue valid. 
On the issue whether a fiduciary power has been exercised for 
the purpose for which it was conferred, it was the opinion 
the the Court that:-
·
11 it is necessary to start with a consideration of the 
power whose exercise is in question, in this case a power 
to issue shares. Having ascertained on a fair view, the 
nature of this power, and having defined as can best be 
done in the light of modern conditions the, or some of 
the limits within which it may be exercised, it is then 
necessary for the Court, if a particular exercise of it 
is challenged, to examine the substantial purpose for 
which it was exercised, and to reach a conclusion whether 
that purpose was· ·proper or not." ( 62) 
But their Lordships went on, and therein, it is submitted, 
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manifested an ambivalence in relation to accepting a separate 
and distinct doctrine of proper purpose:-
"In doing so it will necessarily give credit to the bona 
fide opinion of the directors, if such is found to ex·ist, 
and will respect their judgment as to matters of manage-
ment; having done this, the ultimate conclusion has to 
be as to the side of a fairly broad line on which the 
case falls." ( 63) 
In referring to "matters of management", their Lordships 
were, of course, applying the principle of division of powers 
between the directors and the general meeting. They adver-
ted, on the one hand, to the powers of management afforded to 
directors in terms of the constitution; and, on the other 
hand, to the voting powers of the shareholders in general 
meeting. (64) On this score they were able to achieve two 
distinct ends: Firstly, they were able to distinguish the 
instant case from the cases of Harlowe and Teck, which, 
according to their Lordships, involved considerations of 
management, within the proper sphere of the directors. ( 65 ) 
Secondly, they were able to come to the conclusion that just 
as directors, within their management powers, were entitled 
to make decisions against the wishes of the majority of 
shareholders, so it was unconstitutional for directors to use 
their fiduciary powers over the shares in the company purely 
for the purpose of destroying an existing majority, or creat-
ing a new majority which did not previously exist. Further-
more the exercise by the directors of the fiduciary power 
solely for the purpose of shifting the power to decide to 
whom and at what prices shares were to be sold could not be 
related to any purpoie for which the power of the share capi-
tal had been conferred on them. (66) The Court accordingly 
came to the conclusion that the power had been improperly 
exercised. , (6 7) 
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In determining whether a power had been exercised by the 
directors for an improper purpose, the Court determined 
certain factors that ought to be taken into account, namely:-
(a) a consideration of the power in question; 
(b) a definition of the limits of the power "in the light 
of modern conditions"; 
(c) an examination of the substantial purpose for which the 
power was exercised; 
(d) a giving of credit to the bona fide opinion of the 
( e) 
directors; 
a respecting of the judgment of directors as to matters 
t,; 
of management; (68) 
Birds does not accept that the decision of the Court unequi-
vocally supports the doctrine of proper purpose. It is his 
opinion that the judgment is "inclined towards the midway 
view" between the doctrine being "merely one aspect of the 
basic duty of directors to act bona fide in the interests of 
the company" and "a completely separate head of directors' 
duties" ( 69 ). This opinion seems to• be based upon the 
requirement of the Court to give "credit to the bona fide 
opinion of the directors" and to respect "the judgment of the 
· directors as to matters of management". ( 70 ) 
While it can hardly be argued that the decision of the Court 
rejects the doctrine of proper purpose, it is submitted that 
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the decision does not clearly support the doctrine, nor does 
it overtly distinguish a separate doctrine from the basic 
bona fide doctrine. 
Their Lordships' accepted the principle that regard must be 
had to "the surrounding circumstances • • • which genuinely 
throw light upon that question of the state of mind of the 
directors so as to show whether they were honestly acting in 
discharge of their powers in the interests of the company or 
were acting from some bye-motive, possibly of personal advan-
tage, or for any other reason". (71) 
Furthermore, it was held "the law should not impose such a 
limitation (i.e. shares may be issued only for the purpose of 
raising capital for the company) on directors' powers. To 
define in advance exact limits beyond which directors must 
not pass is impossible" ( 72 ) and that the Court "will 
necessarily give credit to the bona fide opinion of the 
directors and will respect their judgment as to matters 
of management " (73) 
RECENT AUSTRALIAN DECISIONS: 
The judgments in two recently decided Australian cases are 
now considered. The first of these cases is Whitehouse & 
Ano. v. Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd. (74) 
· Charles Whitehouse was the permanent governing director of 
respondent company. The articles of association of the 
company provided that all powers, authorities and discretion 
vested in the board of directors were exercisable by the 
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permanent governing director alone. On 10 January 1974, in 
purported exercise of that discretion, he issued two "B" 
class shares to each of his two sons. The effect of the 
issue was to dilute the voting power attaching to the shares 
held by his former wife and to prevent his daughters and 
their husbands from gaining control over the company. In 
1980, Whitehouse sought to reverse the purported allotments, 
having then fallen out with his sons. At first instance, 
the sons sought an order that the register be rectified by 
the entry of their names as holders of two "B" class shares. 
The case enjoyed the attention of three separate Courts, 
namely, the Supreme Court of Queensland ( 75 ); the Full Court 
of the Supreme Court of Queensland ( 76 ), and the High Court 
of Australia ( 77 ). In the Court of first instance, Andrews, 
S. P. J. found in favour of the plaintiffs. In the Full 
Court, ~elly J with whom Matthews J concurred (Carter J dis-
senting) found in favour of the defendants. In the High 
Court, Mason, Deane and Dawson JJ (Wilson and Brennan JJ dis-
senting) confirmed the decision of the Full Court. The end 
result was that four judges decided in favour of the plain-
tiffs and five in favour of the defendants, the majority 
favouring the invalidity of the issue. An analysis of the 
various judgments reveals a distinct uneasiness on the accep-
tance of a doctrine of proper purpose. Indeed, there are 
strong arguments to be advanced that the dissenting judgments 
are to be preferred. 
In the Court of first instance, the learned judge dealt with 
various matters arising out of the alleg'ations made by the 
defendants to the effect that the purported allotment of 
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shares was null and void with no effect ( 78). Andrews 
S.P.J. held that the aid of the Court had not been sought to 
assist the plaintiffs in the furtherance of any improper 
purpose and that therefore the allotment was valid ( 79). 
The learned trial judge found that in making the allotments 
Charles Whitehouse had taken steps to ensure that the plain-
tiffs would retain control over the management of defendants' 
affairs after his death and that the purpose of the altera-
tion of control was to ensure that the daughters and their 
husbands would not, by the exercise of their voting power, 
gain control over the company, the business of which was 
likely to be better and more efficiently· controlled by his 
On the Hogg v. Cramphorn line this would amount 
'to an exercise of power for an improper purpose and would 
thus fall to be struck down. 
Significantly, though the learned judge found the exercise of 
this power to be val id despite the above because he was 
"satisfied that at the time the allotments were made Charles 
had the interests of the company at heart". ( 81) 
In the majority judgment of the Full Court, Kelly and 
Matthews JJ, accepted these findings of the trial judge but 
came to the conclusion that:-
"The power was not used bona fide and I am of the opinion 
that the purpose for which it was exercised· was not a 
proper one. For these reasons in my view the allotments 
were invalid ••. " ( 82 ) 
Although linked to a proper purpose, the Court's finding was 
based on an absence of the bona fide use of the power. ( 83 ) 
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Carter J, in his dissenting judgment, after an analysis of 
the judgment in Howard Smith v. Ampol Petroleum (84), came to 
the following conclusion:-
"Since therefore in the instant case, the effect of the 
allotment is to create a new majority, it must follow, so 
it is submitted, that the exercise by Charles of his 
fiduciary powers 'must be unconstitutional'. I do not 
understand his Lordship to express a general principle 
that any allotment of shares which creates a new majority 
and destroys an existing one is necessarily invalid. 
Indeed, his Lordship rejected the maintenance of 'extreme 
positions' taken by the protagonists in that case in 
favour of one which requires 'the substantial purpose' 
for which the power was exercised to be examined. Lord 
Wilberforce rejected the exposition in express terms of 
any general proposition, relating to the exercise of 
directors' powers, of the kind for which the appellant 
here contents. At p. 835 he said: 
'To define in advance the exact limits beyond which 
directors must not pass is, in their Lordships' view, 
impossible. This clearly cannot be done by enumera-
tion, since the variety of situations facing direc-
tors of different types of companies in different 
situations cannot be anticipated'". (8 5 ) 
On the strength of the factual findings of the trial judge 
Carter J held: 
"In this case, the findings of the learned trial judge 
are consistent only with the conclusion that against a 
background of intense family disharmony and given the 
apparent prosperity of a long established family 
business, the substantial purpose of the allotment was to 
ensure that upon his death the control of the company 
should pass into experienced hands rather than to those 
who were not only inexperienced but who also at the time 
were intent on winding up the family business. He 
therefore, upon advice, sought to achieve his purpose by 
the challenged allotment rather than by an alteration of 
the articles of association, something which could only 
occur, in any event, with his consent; see cl 8 of the 
memorandum of association. In the light of the findings 
of the learned trial judge as to the substantial purpose 
for the allotment, I find myself unable to disagree with 
his conclusion, that in all of the circumstances, the 
allotment by Charles did not involve an abuse of the 
power given to him by the articles of association." ( 86 ) 
In the High Court, the factual findings of the trial judge as 
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affirmed by the Full Court were not challenged although 
emphasis was placed on the fact that the purpose of the 
allotment was to dilute the voting power by creating a new 
majority. ( 8 7) The majority of the Court accepted that:-
"It is arguable that special circumstances may arise in 
which the dilution of the voting power of an existing 
shareholder or group of shareholders or the creation of 
new voting power may constitute a legitimate purpose to 
be pursued by directors in the exercise of a fiduciary 
_E>ower to allot shares. " ( 88) 
but went on to hold:-
"In that regard, it is unavailing that Mr. Whitehouse was 
not motivated by purely selfish considerations in that he 
believed that the manipulation of voting power in favour 
of his sons at the expense of his former wife was in the 
interests of the company in tha.t it would ensure that the 
management of the company after his death was in the 
hands of those whom he favoured." (89) 
Following the judgment in Hogg v. Cramphorn ( 90) the finding 
of the majority was that:-
"In this as in other areas involving the exercise of 
fiduciary power, the exercise of a power for an ulterior 
or impermissible purpose is bad notwithstanding that the 
motives of the donee of the power in so exercising it are 
substantially altruistic." (91 ) 
and in the result found that the purported allotment of the 
shares was invalid. (93) 
The approach of Wilson J (dissenting) was different in that 
he held that:-
"The consideration of the issue of improper purpose must 
begin with the general proposition that the power to 
allot shares is a fiduciary power which must be exercised 
bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole. 
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This is a broad statement of principle which is not to be 
confined within narrow criterta." (93) 
In line with this approach the learned judge found that:-
"All the circumstances surrounding the allotment must be 
considered in the search to discover the substantial 
object of those taking the action:" (94) 
"It may also be observed that an objective consideration 
which tends to support the conclusion that the allotments 
were made bona fide in the interests of the company as a 
whole lies in the fact that the interests of the "C" 
class shareholders were closely identified with the 
future stability and profitability of the company." (95) 
It is of significance that the learned judge:-
" derived considerable assistance in the consideration 
of this case from the judgment of Berger J. in Teck 
Corporation Ltd. v. Millar (1972 ) 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288, a 
decision which the Judicial Committee in Howard Smith (at 
836-837) considered to be in line with the English and 
Australian authorities discussed in that case. The case 
provides a striking illustration of the propriety of 
directors taking action which they bona fide believed to 
be in the best interests of the company notwithstanding 
that it had the effect of destroying the voting power and 
intentions of the majority shareholder. In the course 
of reaching his decision, Berger J. engages in a critical 
discussion of the decision of Buckley J. in Hogg v. 
Cramphorn Ltd. [1967] Ch. 254 where his Lordship took the 
view that the directors have no right to exercise their 
powers to issue shares, in order to defeat an attempt to 
secure control of the company, even if they consider that 
in doing so they are acting in the company's best 
interests." (96) 
and that he found that: 
"... the approach of Berger J. is consistent with the 
approach of this Court in Harlowe' s Nominees Pty. Ltd. 
v. Woodside. It is supportive of the case advanced for 
the appellants." (97) 
In the result the learned judge concluded that the findings 
of the trial judge ought not to have been disturbed and that 
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the appeal should be allowed. (98) 
The other dissenting judgment (per Brennan J) is no less 
instructive. The judgment indicates an acceptance of the 
factual findings of the Court of first instance, i.e. that 
the ultimate purpose of the allotments was the better and 
more efficient control of the company; (99) and an emphasis 
being laid upon the basic fiduciary duty of acting bona fide 
in the interests of the company:-
"When an issue of shares has the double effect of raising 
needed capital and buttressing shareholder support for 
the directors, it may be a nice question whether the 
directors made the issue honestly in the interests of the 
company albeit with the realisation that the result would 
be agree~ble to them or whether in making the issue they 
had an actual purpose of creating an advantage for them-
selves otherwise than as members of the general body of 
shareholders:" (100) · 
Obviously one cannot ignore the majority judgment and that it 
supports the proper purpose doctrine. At the same time it 
is clear that there was a distinct uneasiness to accept such 
a doctine as separate from the basic doctrine to act bona 
fide in the interests of the company and a reluctance to 
follow Hogg v. Cramphorn (101). 
The second case is Darvall v. North Sydney Brick & Tile Co. 
Ltd. & Ors. ( l O 2 ) . 
The judgment by Hodgson Jin the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales dealt with two issues, one of which related to an 
all~ged breach by a .¢ire~tor of First Defendant of his fidu-
ciary duties. The case did not deal with an issue of shares 
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but a commitment of the company by the directors to·a joint 
venture scheme to develop certain land owned by their company 
( "Norbrik"). The company's most substantial asset was a 
large parcel of land which had been left undeveloped. Over 
a period of 32 years this land had increased enormously in 
value to $60 million. In the early 1980 1 s Norbrik commenced 
investigating various development options for the land. The 
board undertook to consult the members in general meeting 
before committing the company to a particular option. In 
June 1986 D, a shareholder in Norbrik, notified the company 
of his intention to make an of fer for all the shares in 
Norbrik at a price of $10 per share. Previous trading of 
Norbrik shares had been at 87c per share. Norbrik I s board 
of directors opposed D's offer believing it not to be in the 
best interests of the shareholders. The board advised 
shareholders not to accept the offer describing it as "gross-
ly inadequate". In August 1986, less than 3 months after 
D's tal<:e-over of fer was announced, the board of directors 
committed Norbrik to a joint venture scheme to develop the 
land. ( 103 ) 
D brought proceedings seeking an order setting aside the 
joint venture agreement on the ground that it involved a 
breach by the directors of Norbrik of their duty to act 
honestly and in the best interests of the company and that it 
also amounted to an improper exercise by them of their power 
as directors of Norbrik. ( 104 ) 
On behalf of the plaintiff ( "D"), it was submitted that where 
the exercise by the directors of a corporate power is 
challenged, two questions arise: firstly, were the directors 
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acting in good faith in what they considered to be in the 
interests of the company; and secondly, was the power exer-
cised for the purpose for which it was conferred, or for some 
.extraneous purpose. (105) 
The existence of subjective good faith, it was submitted, was 
insufficient to save the purported exercise of the power, if 
the power was exercised for a collateral purpose. If the 
directors came to the conclusion that the plaintiff's offer 
was inadequate, or otherwise should not be accepted, that 
justified no stronger action on their part than the giving of 
full information to the shareholders so that they could make 
an informed decision as to where their interests lay, and the 
making of recommendations if th-e' di rectors thought it appro-
priate to do so. According to the submission, it was uncon-
stitutional for the directors to use their fiduciary powers 
for the purpose of preventing a person acquiring a majority 
of shares. The submission went further to suggest that if 
the purpose of frustrating action was to endeavour to obta.in 
a higher price for shareholders, that would not render this 
purpose proper. It was submitted that if the Court found as 
a fact that but for a desire to prevent the plaintiff from 
acquiring a majority of shares in terms of the offer, the 
directors would not have entered into the transaction upon 
the terms which they did, then the transaction was voidable 
as an abuse of power and the joint venture should accordingly 
be set aside. ( 106 ) 
On behalf of the def~ndants it was submitted that in order to 
succeed, the plaintiff had to prove that the action of the 
directors in entering into the joint venture agreement was 
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not bona fide in the interests of the company as a whole, but 
for an improper or collateral purpose. Further, it had to 
be shown that such improper or collateral purpose was the 
substantial purpose of the directors.· If the decision or 
action sought to be impeached was taken bona fide in the 
interests of the company as a whole, it did not matter that 
it was taken in the context of a takeover of fer or even 
actuated by the fact that a take-over offer had been made. 
According to the submission, and on the authority of Teck' s 
case ( l07), in exceptional cases, the directors could take 
steps 
offer 
for the purpose of 






not in the 
interests of the company as a whole. (108) 
Arising out of the submissions made on behalf of the respec-
tive parties, the learned Judge raised three particular legal 
questions: First, 
second, what were 
to whom did the directors owe their duty; 
the characteristics of the purpose which 
caused a directors action to be impugnable; third, to what 
extent may directors take steps in opposition to a proposed 
take-over offer. (109) The learned Judge was not con-
strained to give a narrow answer to the first question and 
held that directors had to have regard to the interests of 
members of the company, both present and future, as well as 
to the interests of the company as a commercial entity, and 
to the interests of the creditors of the company. ( llO) In 
answer to the second question, the essential characteristic 
of the purpose giving rise to the invalidation of the act in 
question is that such purpose was causative in the sense 
that, but for its presence, the power would not have been 
exercised, i.e. it did not have to be the dominant purpose. 
(111) 
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In relation to the third question, Hodgson J referred firstly 
to what was stated in Teck's case (112), namely, that "direc-
tors are entitled to consider the reputation, experience and 
policies of anyone seeking to take over the company. If 
they decide, on reasonable grounds, a take-over will cause 
substantial damage to the company's interests, they are 
entitled to use their powers to protect the company." (113) 
Secondly, the learned Judge referred to an unreported judg-
ment-· by Megarry V. -c. in Cayne v. Global Natural Resources, 
where his Lordship said:-
"If company A and_ company B are in business cornpetition 1 
and company A acquires a large holding of shares in 
company B with the object of running company 'B down so as 
to lessen its competition, I would have thought that the 
directors of company B might well come to the conclusion 
that it was contrary to the best interests of company B 
to allow company A to effect its purpose, and that in 
fact this would be so. If, then, the directors issue 
further shares in company B in order to maintain their 
control of company B for the purpose of defeating company 
A's plans and continuing company B in competition with 
company A, I cannot see why that should not be a perfect-
ly proper exercise of fiduciary powers by the directors 
of company B. The object is not to retain control as 
such, but to prevent company B from being reduced to 
impotence and beggary, and the only means available to 
the directors for achieving this purpose is to retain 
control. This is quite different from directors seeking 
to retain control because they think they are better 
directors than their rivals would be." (11 4 ) 
In the opinion of the learned Judge, the relevant question 
was whether directors were justified in the face of a take-
over of fer in hastening to cause the company to enter into 
commercial arrangements 1 with the view to presenting to 
shareholders alternatives which may be more attractive than 
the take-over offer. In other words, where directors were 
of the view that to -~ccept the take-over offer would be dis-
advantageous to the shareholders, might they cause the 
company to enter into agreements with a view to demonstrating 
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to shareholders that it is not in their interests to accept 
the take-over offer? Hodgson J came to the conclusion that 
they could, "at least as long as they believe that the agree-
ments or arrangements do advance the commercial interests of 
the company". (115) 
It is not insignificant that the learned Judge, in approach-
ing the question and in coming to his conclusions, did so 
against the background of whether the duty owed by directors 
was to the company as a corporate entity, or to the present 
members of the company, or some other body or 
Interestingly enough, his assessment on this 




from a narrow 
point of view. In other words, in contrast to the earlier 
and more traditional point of view and no doubt in keeping 
with "modern conditions", it was proper for directors to have 
regard to the interests of the members of the company, both 
present and futur~, as well as having r~gard to the interests 
of the company as a commercial entity, and the interests of 
the creditors of the company. Thus it was open to directors 
to take into account the circumstance that many of the share-
holders wished to obtain $ubstantial cash for their shares in 
the short term; that they had been offered a sum which the 
directors considered to be inadequate, and that they could in 
association with the entry into the joint venture agreement 
be secured an of fer in a more substantial sum, which more 
closely approached the true value of the shares, and to act 
accordingly. (116 ) 
In keeping with this approach, the learned Judge said, in 
attempting to characterise the relevant purpose or purposes 
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of the directors, it was necessary "to take a fairly broad 
approach" ( 117): -
"On the whole, as I have said, I think I must take a 
fairly broad approach and look for the subtantial 
purposes of the board as a whole. In doing so, I think 
it is important to ensure that the relevant purposes be 
characterised fairly: in one sense, it may be that the 
substantial purpose of the directors was to defeat the 
plaintiff's bid, but it may also be that this is not a 
fair characterisation of the relevant purpose." (118) 
He went on to hold:-
"However, I'.think that the directors did believe that in 
the circumstances of the existence of the of fer, the 
joint venture agreement was in the best interests of the 
company and of its present shareholders, independently of 
any question of the directors retaining their control of 
the company. In my view, in general, the directors 
thought that acceptance by shareholders of an offer of 
$10 would not be in the best interests of shareholders, 
and thought that in order to demonstrate this fact, it 
was necessary that urgent positive steps be taken towards 
the development of the land. 11 ( 119) 
"In one sense, then, it was a substantial purpose of the 
directors to defeat the plaintiff's bid; but as I 
foreshadowed, I do not consider that to be a fair 
characterisation of their purpose. I think a fair 
characterisation of their purpose would rather be in 
terms of bringing about a situation where shareholders 
(some of whom wanted ready cash for their shares) would 
have alternatives, apart from acceptance of the plain-
tiff's offer. 
It follows that in my view the plaintiff has not made out 
a case for avoidance of the joint venture agreement on 
the basis of improper purpose." (120) 
The Court held thus that the directors were under a duty to 
have regard to the interests of the present and future 
members of the company as well as the interests of the 
company as a commercial entity and of creditors of the 
company. It also held that where directors were of the view 
that many shareholders may accept a take-over offer and that 
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to do so would be disadvantageous to those shareholders, the 
directors may cause the company to enter into agreements or 
arrangements with the view to demonstrating to the share-
holders that it is not in their interests to accept the 
take-over offer provided that the directors believe that the 
agreements or arrangements were in the best interests of the 
company. In the result, the conduct of the directors did 
not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. 
In keeping with the findings in Whitehouse v. Carlton Hotel 
Ltd. ( 121 ), the Court held that a director 1 s action would be 
impugned if there was an improper purpose which were causa-
tive in the sense that but for its presence the action would 
not have been taken, regardless of whether that purpose was 
the dominant one or but one of a number of significantly con-
tributing causes. Having found thus, however, and having 
found that the directors would not have entered the joint 
venture agreement "but for" the making of D's offer, the 
Court nonetheless found that a case for avoidance had not 
been made out on the basis of improper purpose. This was 
because the directors believed that in the circumstances of 
the existence of the offer, the agreement was in the best 
interests of the company and its shareholders, independently 
of any question of the directors retaining their control of 
the company. 
On the basis of the above, one would have expected Hodgson J 
to have found in favour of the Plaintiff but he did not. 
In framing the legal questions which it proposed to consider, 
the Court placed the general contention of the plaintiff in a 
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very narrow ambit, namely, whether the relevant purpose was 
the dominant purpose of the directors, or whether it may 
extend to a purpose which is among a number of dominant 
purposes, that is, purposes but for which the impugned action 
would have been taken. (122) Second, in an application of 
the doctrine, the Court was not inclined towards any strict 
approach. It was "necessary to take a fairly broad 
approach" and it was "important to ensure that relevant pur-
poses be characterised fairly" (123), i.e. "in one sense, it 
may be that the substantial purpose of the directors was to 
defeat the plaintiff's bid, but it may also be that this is 
not a · fair characterisation of the relevant purpose. ( l24) 
While Hodgson J did not refer to the "test" laid down in 
Howard Smith ( 125 ), it would seem that he was either extend-
ing the test, or even formulating a new test in characteris-
ing the relevant purpose or purposes of the directors. 
'l'hird, the question of the subjective state of mind of the 
directors clearly influenced the Court, for as the learned 
Judge was wont to say: 
" I think that the directors did believe that in the 
circumstances of the existence of the offer, the joint 
venture agreement was in the best interests of the 
company ••• " ( 126 ) 
Fourth, the Court seemed influenced by the fact that the 
purposes for which the directors had acted were independent 
"of any question of the directors retaining their control of 
the company". ( 127 ) 
Against this background, it is respectfully submitted that 
the Court, in coming to the conclusion that "the plaintiff 
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(had) not made out a case for avoidance of the joint venture 
agreement on the basis of improper purpose", was reluctant to 
apply strictly a doctrine of proper purpose; was reluctant 
to separate such a doctrine from the "bona fide in the 
interests of the company" duty; was more inclined to the 
approach in Harlowe's (128). and Teck's (129) cases rather 
than that in Hogg v. Cramphorn ( 130); and preferred even a 
wider approach to that taken in Howard Smith (131) 
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It ha~ been observed that there are certain basic principles 
which cannot be disputed. The first is that a director 
stands in a fiduciary relationship towards hi.s company. 
Second, and arising out of this fiduciary relationship, there 
are imposed upon directors certain fundamental fiduciary 
duties, namely, he must use his office and exercise his 
powers bona fide in the interests of the company, and he must 
not place himself in a position where his personal interests 
conflict with his duties to the company. 'rh i rd, where 
directors act to satisfy a self interest, such an interest is 
extraneous. 
DOCTRINE OF PROPER PURPOSE ITS ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION: 
It has also been observed that the doctrine has not met with 
universal judicial acclaim or acceptance. The decision in 
Hogg v. Cramphorn ( 1 ) was _distinguished in Harlowe's Nominees 
(Pty) Ltd. v. Woodside (Lake's Entrance) Oil Co. ( 2 ); 
indeed, there appeared to be a distinct reluctance to follow 
the doctrine of proper purpose. In Teck Corporation Ltd. 
v. Millar ( 3 ) the decision was expressly rejected. The 
. diversity of opinions expressed by the several judges in the 
various Courts which··heard Whitehouse & Ano. v. Carlton Hotel 
Pty Ltd. (4 ) indicates an unease at a ready acceptance of the 
doctrine. In Darvall v. Nort'h Sydney Brick & Tile Co. Ltd. 
- 65 -
& Ors. (5) considerable prominence was given to cases such as 
Harlowe's Nominees (Pty) Ltd. v. Woodside (Lake's Entrance) 
Oil Co. (6) and Teck Corporation v. Millar (7), while no 
mention was made to the decision in Hogg v. Cramphorn (8). 
The decision in Darvall 's case (9), likewise, manifests a 
distinct reluctance to accept the doctrine of proper purpose. 
THE APPROACH OF THE COURTS: 
Thirdly, it has been observed that as a general proposition 
it may be said that the Courts are reluctant to confine or 
restrain or limit directors in the exercise of their powers 
of management. This is so even if the "directors' opinion 
of the needs of the company was imprecise, probably intuitive 
and maybe erroneous", as long as each of the di rectors has 
addressed his mind to the relevant problem and exercised the 
power bona fide. ( 10) In the Howard Smith case ( 11 ) it was 
said that the Court would respect the judgment of directors 
as "to matters of management", and that the.conclusion of the 
Court in the matter of an abuse by directors of their powers 
"has to be as to the side of a fairly broad line on which the 
case falls". ( 12 ) This tendency to broaden the managerial 
role of directors and extend .the scope of their activities 
even to the extent of encroaching upon the constitutional 
powers of members is to be detected in the references to the 
application of the powers of directors in the modern 
commercial context. It is to this aspect of the matter that 
attention is now directed. 
I 
- 66 -
THE TRADITIONAL AND MODERN PERCEPTIONS OF THE ROLE OF 
DIRECTOR$: 
In Teck Corporation Ltd. v. Millar (13) Berger J referred to 
the "classical theory" which, according to the learned judge, 
is that the directors I duty is to the company. The com-
pany' s shareholders are the company. Therefore no interest 
outside those of the shareholders can legitimately be con-
sidered by the directors. This, of course, in some degree, 
begs the question, in that, what falls within the definition 
of the interests of the shareholders, and, by what standards 
are the shareholders' interests to be measured? Nonetheless, 
it accords with long established principle (14). 
Berger J went on to opine that "a classical 
was unchallengeable must yield to the facts 
~\ ; \ ' theory that once 1.·1. · 
of modern life" J~ 
According to the learned Judge the "classical theory" 
had yielded "to the facts of modern life" and he states a 
number of propositions. First, if the directors of a corn-
pany, in the modern context, were to consider the interests 
of its employees no one would argue that in doing so they 
were not acting bona fide in the interests of the company it-
self. Second, if the directors were to consider the conse-
quences to the community of any policy that the company 
intended to pursue, and were deflected in their commitment to 
that policy, it could not be said that they had not con-
sidered bona fide the interests of the shareholders. Third, 
and appreciating that it would be a breach of their duty to 
disregard entirely the interests of a company's shareholders 
in order to confer a benefit on its employees, if they were 
to observe a decent respect for other interests lying beyond 
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those of the company's shareholders in the strict sense, that 
will not, leave directors open to the charge that they have 
failed in their fiduciary duty to the company. 
Against the background of what he describes as "the modern 
·'managerial' technique of management" where "directors are 
conceived • . . as standing at the hub of the company's busi-
ness wheels" ( 16), Beuthin ( l 7) raises two interesting ques-
tions: "to what interests may the directors legitimately 
have regard in their management of the company's business?" 
and "may they ( the directors), in appropriate cases, allow 
those other interests to override possibly conflicting 
interests of the shareholders?" 
Many years before the enactment of Section 309 ( 1) of the 
Companies Act ( 18 ), it was Beuthin' s opinion that directors 
were entitled to have regard to the interests of the 
company's employees in so far as those interests may conse-
quentially affect the interests of the company (19). But he 
does not confine his comments to the interests of the com-
pany' s employees. In a series of searching questions he 
adverts to the "interests of the consumer"; "the interests 
of the public"; the "interests of · the State"; "the 
interests of the company's overseas image", ( 20), and he 
comes to the conclusion (as with employees) that it is_ within 
the sphere of the director's duty to consider and satisfy the 
interests of "customers, trade connections, the local commu-
· ni ty and the nation" ( 21). Ii is his considered view that:-
"Public opinion no longer shares the view that directors 
should always be compelled to act 'in the interests of 
the company', regarding only those matters as relevant 
which in some way or another are capable of feathering 
the shareholder nest." (22) 
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" •.• the horizons of his (the director's) boardroom 
extend a great deal further than the share register 11 
(23) 
Moreover, while no such general directors' duty has yet been 
formulated by a South African Court, and while there are some 
dicta which reject the suggesti6n (24), there are other dicta 
in some cases to the effect that directors are under a duty 
to have regard to the interests of creditors (25). 
The question that arises is how wide a latitude ought the 
directors to have. Thus if a person or group is seeking to 
obtain control, must they be ignored, or must the directors 
blindly follow the decisions of the general meeting in regard 
thereto. Does a blind following of the decisions of the 
general meeting constitute a discharge of their fiduciary 
duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company. Or 
are they entitled to consider the consequences of such group 
taking over. If they do, and act thereupon in what they, 
believe to be in the interests of the company, do they act in 
breach of their fiduciary duties. Ought not directors to be 
allowed to consider who is seeking control and the reason 
therefor. Moreover, having made their investigation and 
having bona fide and for .. good reason come to the conclusion 
that there will be substantial damage to the company's 
interests if the company be taken over, then to exercise 
their powers to defeat those seeking majority, can such con-
duct necessarily be categorised as improper. Othenvise 
stated: if the directors conclude that the take-over will be 
detrimental to the interests of the company, and they do not 
exercise their powers to defeat the majority-seekers, will 
this not constitute a breach of their fiduciary duties. 
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Tune quotes from Northwest Industries, Inc. v. The B.F. 
Goodrich co. (26): 
"Management has the responsibility to oppose offers 
which, in its best judgment, are detrimental to the com-
pany or its stockholders. In arriving at such a judg-
ment, management should be scrupulously fair in consider-
ing the merits of any proposal submitted to its stock-
holders. The officers' and directors,✓ informed opinion 
should result from that strict impartiality which is 
required by their fiduciary duties. After taking these 
steps, the company may then take any step not forbidden 
by law to counter the attempted capture" (27). 
His own view is that "it is difficult to take issue with this 
approach or to see on what grounds it might be at tacked" 
Obviously there must be a limit to the exercise of the direc-
tors' powers and such limits ought to be clearly defined but 
must such limit of the directors' powers go to the extent of 
that required by Hogg v. Cramphorn? (29) 
If one accepts that the exercise of a particular power must 
be seen "in the light of modern conditions" (30), or that the 
classical theories "must yield to the facts of modern life", 
(31 ) and if credit must be given "to the bona fide opinion of 
the directors" (3 2 ), and if "their judgment as to matters of 
management" are to be respected ( 33 ), then, is the general 
rule not that the directors must act in good faith? There 
must, of course, be reasonable grounds for their belief that 
there will be substantial damage to the company's interest 
and in its absence the Court wi 11 be justified in finding 
that the directors were actuated by an improper motive. (34) 
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DIRECTORS 1 POWERS OF MANAGEMENT: 
The trend in accordance with "the facts of modern life" ( 35) 
and "in the light of modern conditions" (36), it is submit-
ted, is two-fold: first, it is to extend the powers of 
directors and thereby to limit the rights of shareholders. 
Second, it is to give a i"iberal interpretation to the powers 
of directors in their management of the business of the 
company. Palmer (3 7 ) does suggest that even broadly worded 
particular articles conferring powers upon directors must be 
construed in the context of the articles as a whole in order 
to establish whether any limitation should be read into the 
article conferring apparently unlimited power. He goes on, 
however, to say that on a proper construction of the articles 
~o such limitation should be implied. ( 38) 
Gower ( 39 ) says that the directors are the primary organs of 
the company and that they can "if they are so advised, to 
disregard the wishes and instructions of the members in all 
matters not specifically reserved (either by the Act or the 
articles) to a general meeting" until such time as the 
✓general meeting exercises its powers to amend the articles 
and to remove the directors. 
This means that articles, if a~propriately framed can cut 
down on the rights of shareholders to any extent which the 
articles on their true construction permit. Indeed, there 
· is nothing in principle or authority to make it impossible to 
draft such a wide and comprehensive power to directors so as 
to enable them to take into account any matter which they 








Where the articles are framed with some limitation on the 
discretionary power of directors, it follows that if they go 
outside the matters which the articles say are to be the 
matters to which they are to have regard, the directors will 
have exceeded their powers and acted beyond their authority. 
The question, therefore, is whether on a true construction of 
the particular article, the directors are limited by anything 
except their bona fide view of the interests of the company. 
Where the articles are drafted in the widest possible terms, 
the Court will not write into that clear language any limita-
tion other than a limitation which is implicit by law, that a 
fiduciary power must be exercised bona fide in the interests 
of the company. Subject to the "bona fide in the interest 
of the company" qualification, an article in this form can 
give to the directors an absolute and uncontrolled discre-
tion. 
As to the latitude given to the directors or the limitation 
imposed upon them in the exercise of their powers, the 
learned judge in Harlowe's case found ( 40): 
"Directors in whom are vested the right and the duty of· 
deciding where the company's interests lie and how they 
are to be served may be concerned with a wide range of 
practical considerations, and their judgment, if exer-
cised in good faith and not for irrelevant purposes, is 
not open to review in the courts. Thus in the present 
case it is not a matter for judicial concern, if it be 
the fact, that the allotment to Burrnah would frustrate 
the ambitions of someone who was buying up shares as 
opportunity offered with a view to obtaining increased 
influence in the control of the company, or even that the 
directors realized that the allotment would have that 
result and found it agreeable to their personal wishes: 
Mills v. Mills. But if, in making the allotment, the 
directors had an. actual purpose of thereby creating an 
advantage for themselves otherwise than as members of the 
general body of shareholders, as for instance by buttres-
sing their d~rectorships against an apprehended attack 
from such as Harlowe, the allotment would plainly be 
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voidable as an abuse of the fiduciary power, unless 
Burmah had no notice of the facts." 
In regard to the latitude that ought to be afforded to direc-
tors in the matter of the management of the business of the 
company in relation to a :_~~-o~~ .. ~.i,tuation, it was the view <) 
of the Court in Teck's case (41) that directors ought to be 
allowed to consider who is seeking control and why. If they 
believe that there will be substantial damage to the 
company's interests if the company was taken over, then the 
exercise of their powers to defeat those seeking a majority 
will not necessarily be categorised as improper. 'I'he Court 
was of the view that it was not sound to limit the directors' 
exercise of their powers to the extent required by Hogg v. 
Cramphorn Ltd. (42). It accordingly declined to follow that 
decision. In coming to a conclusion Berger J referred to 
the judgment in Savoy Corp. Ltd. v. Development Underwriting 
Ltd. ( 43) where regard was had to "the structure of modern 
companies and of modern business life in the following terms: 
11 It would seem to . me to be unreal in the light of the 
structure of modern companies and of modern business to 
take the view that directors should in no way concern 
themselves with the infiltration of the company by 
persons or groups why they bona fide consider not to be 
seeking the best interests of the compa.ny." 
The ultimate question, according to the learned judge in 
Harlowe' s case (44 ) "must always be whether in truth the 
issue was made honestly in the interests of the company". 
THE RIGHTS AND ROLE OF MEMBERS: 
The rights and powers of the members are those vested by the 
articles in the general body of shareholders. When a 
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company's constitution makes no provision for a particular 
matter the members have inherent powers to deal with it 
Moreover, even if specific powers have been assigned 
to the directors the members can still exercise those powers 
in certain circumstances (46). The general meeting also has 
powers to amend the articles; to remove the directors and to 
substitute others, and to this extent it retains ultimate 
control (47 ). Directors, obviously, cannot usurp the powers 
which by the articles are vested in the members, and where 
they endeavour so to do, they exceed their powers to act 
beyond their authority. 
In addition, a shareholder has propriety rights in relation 
to his shares exercisable in the normal course. As such, he 
enjoys the freedom to dispose of his propriety interest when-
soever and to whomsoever he pleases. This is an unfettered 
right. If, therefore, the shareholder wishes to sell his 
shares to a party, the fact that the purchaser happens to be 
on the take-over trail, is a factor which can be held in com-
plete indifference. The motives of the purchase do not 
concern the shareholder and he is not legally obliged ( and 
some might suggest is not· morally obliged) to concern himself 
with the motives of the prospective purchaser. It would 
therefore be nothing more than blatant impertinence for the 
directors to presume to prescribe to the shareholders what is 
in their own interests and for their own good. That deci-
sion is one which lies solely in the province of the share-
holder. 
• 
While this cannot be disputed the fact remains that where the 
articles confer on the directors the power to manage the 
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business of the company, the directors can disregard the 
wishes of the shareholders in all matters not specifically 
reserved to the general meeting. It is clear that in the 
modern context, an increasingly wide interpretation is being 
placed on the "management clause" in company articles ( 48). 
Accordingly, where directors exercise their powers bona fide 
in the interests of the company, they ought not to attract 
liability or be subject to legal sanction, even if the rights 
of individual shareholders are affected (49). 
It is not contended that the powers of directors ought to be 
unlimited; nor is it contended that shareholders should have 
no rights. The contention that is being advanced is that in 
the modern context where directors stand "at the hub of the 
company's wheels" ( 50 ) there is no scope for an additional 




Where directors .act beyond their authority, 
legal remedy is avalable to shareholders. 
they act bona fide in the interests of the 
company such conduct should be allowed to override conflict-
ing· interests of the shareholders. 
THE DECISION IN HOGG v. CRAMPHORN: (51) 
Certain observations are to be, made concerning the basic 
fiduciary duty to act bona fide in the interests of the 
company. First, it involves a subjective approach, i.e. as 
·to.what the directors genuinely believed when exercising 
their powers. Second, it involves an objective approach in 
that regard must be had to the presence of reasonable grounds 
for the directors I exercise of their powers as the test of 
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good faith. Subjectively, the directors in a matter of 
dealing in the company's shares must have considered the con-
sequences of a transfer of control, and objectively, they 
must have acted upon reasonable grounds. Obviously, if 
there are no reasonable grounds for the directors' alleged 
belief, and their purpose was merely to exercise control over 
a group of shareholders, then the basic bona fide duty is 
breached, and the transaction is liable to be set aside. If 
then, objectively, the take-over would have had profound con-
sequences for the company's whole way of doing business and 
subjectively, the directors believed that it would damage the 
company's interests, then reasonable grounds for the exercise 
of the directors' powers would be found to exist. 
In Hogg v. Cramphorn ( 52 ), the Court accepted "that the 
directors were not actuated by unworthy motives 
advantage, but acted as they did in an honest 




satisfies the subjective requirement. It would seem also 
that the Court accepted that there were reasonable grounds 
for this belief, i.e. that the scheme would be likely to 
prevent the displacement . of an experienced management by an 
inexperienced one. 
objective requirement. 
This, it is submitted, satisfies the 
Was the Court therefore right in proceeding to adopt the 
approach that the primary purpose of the scheme "was to 
ensure control of the company by the directors and those whom 
they could confidently regard as their supporters''; ( 54 ) and 
was the Court justified in asl<ing the question: "Was such 
manipulation of the voting position a legitimate act on the 
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part of the directors?" (55) Did the Court not err in then 
proceeding on the basis of the principle of the separation of 
the company's powers and thereby impose too strict a limita-
tion on the exercise of the powers of directors as opposed to 
the exercise of its constitutional rights by the majority? 
In his analysis of the decision in Hogg v. Cramphorn, L.S. 
Sealy submits that:-
" the learned judge ought to have considered himself 
free, both on authority and on the merits of the case, to 
uphold the directors' own bona fide view that their 
action was in the best interests of the company. There 
should be no test other than the genuineness of the 
directors' own motive, provided of course that their view 
is one that could reasonably be held - the line is drawn 
short of their being 'amiable lunatics'". (56) 
Tune in his assessment of the decision is more explicit:-
"Why did not the learned judge distinguish the case on 
the basis that the two preceding decisions (i.e. Punt v. 
Symons and Co. Ltd. and Piercy v. Mills & Co. Ltd.) were 
cases of 'dishonest improper purpose' while he was facing 
an 'honest improper purpose'? But when in a given 
case a judge has stated: I am quite clear that 
these shares were not issued bona fide for the general 
ad vantage of the company', why is it that a subsequent 
judge feels bound by this decision in a case when the 
directors 'acted as they did in an honest belief that 
they were doing what was for the good of the company'? 
What is more, Byrne J., in the first case, had taken 
pains to repeat that the power to issue shares 'must be 
exercised for the benefit of the company: primarily ••• 
to raise capital' but occasionally 'for other reasons'. 
Would not a holding in favour of the board in Hogg v. 
Cramphorn Ltd. have been in perfect accordance with the 
first case?" ( 57 ) 
Three possible situations present themselves: first, the 
directors usurped powers reserved to the members and thereby 
exceeded their authority. Second, the directors acted to 
ensure control of the company and the ref ore were not bona 
fide in the exercise of their powers. Third, the directors 
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acted bona fide in the interests of the company. In neither 
the first nor the second of the situations was there any need 
to introduce a new doctrine. In the third, the Court ought 
to have held in the favour of the directors. 
SUMMING UP: 
In the exercise of. their fiduciary duties, directors are 
required to exercise their powers bona fide in the interests 
of the company. If they fail to act bona fide in the 
interest of the company, they open themselves to liability 
and to legal sanction. Where, in the past, directors acted 
bona fide in the interests of the company, they properly dis-
charged their fiduciary duties. 
A new doctrine seems to have arisen. Notwithstanding good 
faith on the part of directors, if, in the exercise of their 
powers, they acted for some improper purpose, . they, nonethe-
less, attracted liability and opened themselves to legal 
sanction. 
doctrine. 
It is submitted that there is no basis for such a 
Directors are given the power to manage the affairs of the 
company. They must exercise the power in good faith and 
according to their best judgment~ They are fiduciaries and 
not omniscients. They manage the business of the company in 
a modern commercial context. The trend of this modern com-
mercial context is to extend the managerial role; to enlarge 
the scope of the managerial function, and to give a liberal 
interpretation to what constitutes matters of management. 
It is the directors who must decide where the company's best 
- 78 -
interests lie and how they may best be servedi and in so 
doing they may have to have regard to a wide range of practi- 0 
cal considerations. 
The Courts have always shown a reluctance to confine or 
restrain or limit directors in the exercise of the powers of 
management; to define limits beyond which directors must not 
pass; and to substitute its discretion for the discretion 
given to directors. 
Obviously, directors cannot be allowed to exercise their 
powers free of restraint or limitation; neither can share-
holders be denuded of all forms of control. Wherein does 
the balance lie? It is respectfully submitted that the 
restraints and limitations imposed upon directors should be 
confined to the following:-
(a) they must not exceed their authority; 
(b) they must exercise their powers bona fide in the 
interests of the company, and where they do there must 
be no recourse against the directors, even if the 
rights of individual shareholders are affected. In 
determining whether the directors have acted bona fide 
in the inte.rests of the company, the Court must adopt a 
subjective approach in order to determine what the 
directors genuinely believed when exercising their 
powers. Second, the Court must adopt an objective 
approach to ~etermine the presence of reasonable 
grounds for the directors' exercise of their powers. 
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The fact cannot be escaped that a form of the doctrine of 
proper purpose exists. The contention, however, is advanced 
that there is a reluctance to accept an unqualified doc-
trine. It is further contended that as the line brc:i.adens 
between the management role of directors and the cons ti tu-
tional role of shareholders respectively, so the doctrine 
will move back within the framework of the basic "bona fide" , 
test. 
The dichotomy which seems to present itself, namely as to 
what the law should, or is likely, to be; 
is, is stated by Gore-Brown as follows:-
and the law as it 
"Modern management often takes the view that the. 
interests to be tak~n into account by directors in runn-
ing a company should include the interests of not only 
the present and future shareholders, but also the 
company's employees, its customers and creditors and, in 
the case of large companies at least, the State and the 
general public. No doubt this represents an adequate 
practical guide for most decisions that a director has to 
take. It is, however, estabished that from the point of 
view of strict law, 'the interests of the company' means 
those of the present and future shareholders alone, and 
that the only circumstances in which the directors may 
legitimately promote the interests of any of the other 
groups or entities mentioned are where to do so ultimate-
ly advances the interests of the shareholders." ( 58 ) 
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